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Abstract  
Leaky-bucket transactions can be regarded as income transfers allowing for 
transaction costs. In its most rudimentary form, leaky-bucket transactions trace out 
the maximum “leakage” of transaction costs before income inequality is exacerbated, 
or—alternatively—before a welfare loss is experienced. This notion suggests that part 
of the income transfer should reach the transferee in order to keep the degree of 
income inequality or social welfare intact.  
However, in general, this conjecture is theoretically wrong. Rather there exists a 
unique benchmark such that it holds only for transfers among income recipients 
below the benchmark. When both are above the benchmark, the transferee has to be 
given more than the amount taken from the transferor, and when they are on 
opposite sides of the benchmark, both should experience an income loss. These three 
cases cover progressive transfers only. Three more cases apply to regressive transfers, 
and six more cases apply to income gains. Each of these twelve cases is covered by 
the present paper.  
Yet experimental research shows poor empirical evidence for this theory. Subjects’ 
perceptions of maintaining the degree of income inequality rather follow a simple 
precept: If someone gains income, the other person involved should be positively 
compensated, and if someone loses income, the other person involved should be 
negatively compensated. This expresses sort of compensating justice rather than 
restoration of the former degree of income inequality according to the orthodox 
theory. Compensating justice is, however, at variance with the transfer principle. 
 
JEL Classification: D31, D63, C91. It seems that Okun (1975, pp. 91-95) was the ﬁrst who investigated the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle in the face of transaction costs. The pure transfer principle states that
an order preserving transfer from a richer to a poorer income recipient should decrease
income inequality. Okun started out with an approval of the pure transfer principle, but
remarked that in reality “the money must be carried from the rich to the poor in a leaky
bucket. Some of it will simply disappear in transit, so the poor will not receive all the
money that is taken from the rich.” [Okun (1975, p. 91).]
Then, in some kind of thought experiment, Okun (1975, p. 91) put the following
question to an outside ethical observer: “I shall not try to measure the leak now, because
I want you to decide how much leakage you would accept and still support the Tax-and-
Transfer Equalization Act.” Later on, Okun (1975, p. 94) states his own view: “Since I
feel obliged to play the far-fetched games that I make up, I will report that I would stop
at the leakage of 60 percent in this particular example.”
Thus, Okun wants the outside ethical observer to trace out the maximum leakage of
a transfer from richer to poorer income recipients which would just be tolerable to him
or her. Although Okun is not explicit about the measure to be applied to determine the
maximum leakage, we will not go astray in assuming that he had the observer’s judgment
on the social welfare of the society in mind. More precisely, if an amount δ is taken from
a richer income recipient and is transferred to a poorer income recipient, then, in the
absence of transaction costs, the gain in social welfare due to the increase in income of
the poorer income recipient exceeds the loss of social welfare due to the decrease in income
of the richer income recipient. This results from the transfer principle. The leaky-bucket
case means, however, that the poorer income recipient gets less, say an amount ϕ < δ,
instead of δ. Let γ + minϕ. Then the maximum tolerable leakage, (δ − γ), results from
the minimum amount of ϕ, viz. γ > 0, that the poorer income recipient should receive
such that no loss in social welfare is experienced.
However, Okun does not stop here. He states that the tolerated leakage is an increasing
function of the income level of the transferors: “If the proposed tax were to be imposed
only on the handful of wealthiest American families with annual incomes above $ 1 million,
you might well support the equalization up to a much bigger leakage. In fact, some people
would wish to take money away from the super-rich even if not one cent reached the poor.”
(Okun (1975, p. 94); our emphasis.)
1It is, in particular, this last statement which deserves closer attention. An ethical
observer who subscribes to this judgment considers a decrease in the income of a super-
rich income recipient by δ to increase social welfare even if the poor income recipients do
not get anything, i.e., ϕ = 0. Note, however, that leaky-bucket transactions imply that
γ 6= 0. This is easy to be seen: when such outside ethical observer is asked whether (s)he
would approve of a tax which pinches the super-rich income recipients by δ, but, due to
constitutional reasons of tax universality, has to tax also the poor income recipients at
ϕ, then this observer should endorse such a tax provided that 0 <| ϕ |<| γ |.1 In other
words, taxing the rich income recipients at δ and the poor at γ just maintains the level
of social welfare.
So far, we have interpreted the outside ethical observer’s judgment in terms of social
welfare, which seems to us what Okun had primarily in mind. But this is not the only
basis of judgements on income distributions. Income inequality measures are perhaps
the more primitive concept to judge income distributions. Moreover, income inequality
measures and social welfare functions are ordinally equivalent, as was shown by Blackorby
and Donaldson (1978) and Dagum (1990, 1993).
In terms of income inequality measures the maximum tolerable leakage is deﬁned such
that the income inequality as measured by a particular inequality measure is not ex-
acerbated, i.e., the income inequality measure remains constant. Preliminary reasoning
would suggest that leakages are only acceptable if they leave part of the transfer for the
transferee.2
However, Seidl (2001), Hoﬀmann (2001), and Lambert and Lanza (2006) showed that
this conjecture is theoretically wrong. Rather there exists a unique benchmark as a
function of the income inequality measure and the income distribution applied, such that
the above conjecture holds only when both parties involved in a progressive transfer have
incomes below the benchmark. When both parties have incomes above the benchmark,
then the transferee has to receive even a higher amount than that taken from the transferor
in order to maintain the degree of income inequality. When the parties lie on opposite
sides of the benchmark, then also the “transferee” should suﬀer an income loss in order
to maintain the degree of income inequality. More formally, this is stated in the Leaky-
Bucket Theorem [Theorem 10].
Recall that Okun invited responses of subjects to determine the extent of the tolera-
2ble leakage. This calls for experiments.3 As to the full experimental design, note that
transfers are not conﬁned to progressive transfers (i.e., going from richer to poorer income
recipients). Transfers can rather occur according to four categories: The income of an
income recipient may either be increased or decreased by a certain amount δ, and the
other income recipient, whose income should be adapted by an amount γ, may either
be richer or poorer than the ﬁrst one. For each of these four categories the respective
incomes can lie above, below, or on opposite sides of the benchmark. This makes twelve
cases to be analyzed.4 The experimental design used in this paper investigates all four
categories, i.e., all twelve cases.
The paper is arranged as follows: Section I gives an appraisal on the theory of leaky-
bucket transactions, Section II describes the experimental design and procedure, Section
III presents the results, and Section IV concludes.
I Theory
In this section we describe the leaky-bucket theory as required by our experimental de-
sign.5 The number of income recipients is assumed to be ﬁnite; all incomes are assumed to
be diﬀerent and strictly positive. The anonymity axiom holds. The inequality measures
are assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable.
Thus, we consider only income distributions y = {yi | i = 1,...,n; 1 < n < ∞} such
that, by the anonymity axiom, we can focus on an increasing arrangement of incomes,
0 < y1 < y2 < ... < yn < ∞. More generally, income inequality measures are denoted by
I : Rn
++ → R+.6
Definition 1: I(·) is scale invariant if I(y) = I(λy) for all y ∈ Rn
++, λ > 0. I(·) is
translation invariant if I(y) = I(y + ζe) for all y ∈ Rn
++ and for all ζ ∈ R such that
y1 + ζ > 0, where e denotes the unit vector.




























































for yj < yk.
Remark 5: For inequality sympathy (which was often observed in experiments7) the
inequality signs in Deﬁnition 4 are reversed.
Definition 6: I(·) satisﬁes the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle if
I(y + τek − τej) < I(y) and I(y − τek + τej) > I(y) for all yk < yj,
where ei denotes an n−dimensional vector with a 1 on the i−th position and zeros every-
where else, and τ is such that 0 < τ < mini,`∈{1,...,n} | yi − y` |.
Theorem 7: For diﬀerentiable inequality averse income inequality measures which are




for all yi < y∗, and
∂I
∂yi
> 0 for all yi > y∗.







increases monotonically as yi increases. Hence, there exists a
benchmark, y∗, such that
∂I
∂yi
< 0 for all yi < y∗ and ∂I
∂yi > 0 for all yi > y∗.
Q.E.D.
Remark 8: It seems that the existence and properties of benchmarks have ﬁrst been
noticed and analyzed by Seidl (2001) and Hoﬀmann (2001). The most comprehensive
study is due to Lambert and Lanza (2006). Lambert and Lanza (2006, Theorem 1, p.
255) prove the existence of a benchmark by way of Lorenz consistency of an income
inequality measure. Recall that a Lorenz curve is scale invariant by deﬁnition. Hence, we
hold that Theorem 7 is somewhat more general, as it covers also the case of translation
invariance.
Remark 9: Hoﬀmann (2001, p. 238) considers the benchmark as sort of natural dividing
line between the “relatively poor” and the “relatively rich” and, hence, treats it as the
relative poverty line. Notice, however, that the benchmark depends both on the income
distribution and on the income inequality measure applied. Hence, the poverty line, too,
would depend on the income distribution and on the income inequality measure applied.
While the former dependence is judicious, the latter dependence would make the set of
the poor dependent on the income inequality measure applied, which is somewhat odd
for a poverty line.
We are now ready to state the basic theoretical results of the leaky-bucket theory. Note
that they are independent of the particular income inequality measure applied; it is just
assumed to be diﬀerentiable, inequality averse, and scale invariant. These results will
then be subject to experimental testing, which, however, requires assumptions as to the
income inequality measures applied.
Theorem 10 (Leaky-Bucket Theorem): Let I(·) denote a diﬀerentiable, inequality
averse, and scale or translation invariant income inequality measure with y∗ as its bench-
mark. Consider two income recipients, j and k, and assume that j’s income is changed
by δ, where | δ |< mini,`∈{1,...,n} | yi − y` |. Determine the change γ of k’s income such








δ > 0 δ < 0
yj < yk yj > yk yj < yk yj > yk
y∗ > yj,yk γ < −δ −δ < γ < 0 γ > −δ −δ > γ > 0
y∗ < yj,yk −δ < γ < 0 γ < −δ −δ > γ > 0 γ > −δ
y∗ between yj and yk γ > 0 γ > 0 γ < 0 γ < 0











The cells in the above table result from Deﬁnition 4 and Theorem 7.
Q.E.D.
Notice that the leaky-bucket theory is not at variance with the transfer principle.
Note the diﬀerence: the transfer principle focuses on changes in the degree of income
inequality when transaction costs are absent, i.e., when the income of one income recipient
is changed by δ, the income of a corresponding income recipient is changed by −δ. Then,
by Deﬁnition 4, income inequality is decreased for progressive transfers [i.e., if either δ < 0
and yj > yk or if δ > 0 and yj < yk] and increased for regressive transfers [i.e., if either
δ < 0 and yj < yk or if δ > 0 and yj > yk]. By contrast with the transfer principle,
the leaky-bucket theory focuses on transfers with leakages which maintain the degree of
income inequality, i.e., normally we have δ 6= −γ.
II The Experiment
The main goal of our experiment is testing the validity of the leaky-bucket theory as
established in Theorem 10. As there is no way of extracting the benchmarks (whose
existence was before long not even known to the experts) directly from our subjects, we
had to take another route. Hence, we asked our subjects for the assessments of their γ’s
in the twelve cells of the table in Theorem 10. Subjects faced a change of j’s income by
6δ and had to determine the change in k’s income, γ, that would re-establish the same
degree of income inequality as in the situation before j’s income change. The data gained
in this way were then used to test the leaky-bucket theory.
A The Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted at the KiEEL laboratory (Kiel Experimental Economics
Laboratory) at the University of Kiel, Germany. Subjects were volunteers recruited from
the students of diﬀerent departments of this university. Many of them were not acquainted
with income distributions. Therefore, subjects received a short training in handling in-
come distributions before coming to the laboratory. (The training program is provided
in the Appendix.) In this training, the concepts of income distributions, scale invariance,
and the transfer principle were explained. Subjects were alerted that income distribu-
tions may be evaluated along diﬀerent criteria: First, they may be judged according to
the subjects’ perceptions of being more equally or more unequally distributed. Second,
they may be judged according to warranting a greater GDP for the economy, irrespective
of the distribution of the incomes. Third, they may be judged according to securing higher
aggregate social welfare, where we stressed that social welfare had to be judged according
to the values of the beholders. Fourth, they may be judged according to the subjects’
preferences for income distributions if their income positions were determined under an
ex-ante veil of ignorance. We asked subjects to focus on the ﬁrst criterion.
Then the instructions of the experiment were explained to the subjects. (A transcript
with the instructions is provided in the Appendix.) The experimental design involved
the income distribution [e500, e750, e1000, e1250, e1500, e1750, e2000], which was
proposed to represent the monthly incomes of seven income recipients (e.g., students).
Using Abbink and Sadrieh’s (1995) Ratimage toolbox, these incomes were presented in
the upper half of a computer screen as illustrated in Figure 1. The same diagram was
displayed on the lower half of the screen. Upon pressing any key, the income of an income
recipient was increased or diminished by e100 (standing proxy for our δ in Theorem 10).
At the same time, the income of another income recipient was set equal to zero as an
indicator that the subject was required to adapt this income.
The upper half of the screen continued to present the original diagram highlighting
7now the incomes involved in the corresponding question, reminding the subjects of the
original income distribution.
The subject was asked to adapt the income set to zero in the lower half of the screen
such that the degree of income inequality of the original income distribution would be
re-established in the new one8. Every decision of the subject was shown in the diagram
on the screen, and the subject was asked either to conﬁrm the answer or to try out some
other decisions. The subject was allowed to play round as long as he or she wanted to
do so before making his or her decision deﬁnitive.9 In total, 84 combinations [7×6, each
for +e100 and −e100] were presented to each subject in a random order. Subjects were
also told that the change in an income recipient’s income by ±e100 was only caused by
some chance event beyond the control of any party.10
Figure 1: Screenshot
This experiment required much attention and eﬀort on the part of the subjects. To
induce subjects to participate in our experiment, we relied on their interest in the topic,
since we did not know of an incentive-compatible payment r´ egime that would not have
biased subjects’ responses.11 We ended up with the data of 41 subjects.12
8B The Numerical Benchmarks
Note from Theorem 7 that the benchmark is implicitly deﬁned by setting the partial
derivatives equal to zero. Now, the partial derivatives are functions of both the income
distributions and the parameters of the respective income inequality measures applied. As
the income distribution involved is given by our experimental design, the partial deriva-
tives are functions of the parameters of the applied income inequality measures only.
The graph of the income levels for which the partial derivatives assume the value zero
for the respective parameter values of the income inequality measure is the graph of the
benchmarks. For the computation of the graphs of the benchmarks we selected the most
common income inequality measures, viz. the entropy income inequality measure, the ex-
tended Atkinson income inequality measure, and the extended Gini inequality measure.13
The respective graphs of the benchmark functions are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that the function of the benchmarks for the entropy inequality measure
is S-shaped as a function of the parameter c, that the function of the benchmarks for the
extended Atkinson inequality measure is ogival-shaped (counter-S-shaped) as a function
of the parameter θ, and that the function of the income categories for the extended Gini
inequality measure is decreasingly convex-shaped as a function of the parameter ν.
Inserting the seven incomes of our experimental design as benchmarks into the equa-
tions for the benchmarks (whose graphs are shown in Figure 2)14 allows us, by monotonoc-
ity of the benchmark functions, to compute the associated parameter values for the seven
incomes to become the benchmarks. They are summarized in Table 1.
Measures
Income levels yi
500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
Atkinson’s θ 3.2 × 107 6.77 3.11 1 1.68 8.88 3.3 × 106
Gini’s ν b a 18.12 7.27 3.54 1.72 a a
Entropy inc. inequ. c −3.26 × 106 -5.77 -2.11 0 2.68 9.88 3.2 × 106
a Not deﬁned.
b Rank positions converted into income levels.
Table 1: Zero Positions of Partial Derivatives Evaluated at yi, i = 1,...,7.
Table 1 shows us that only benchmarks between e750 and e1500 are associated with
9reasonable values of the parameters of the most common income inequality measures. All
other benchmarks require excessive parameter values of inequality attitudes, which were
never evidenced in empirical research. Therefore, we can restrict the benchmarks to lie
in the open interval (e750, e1500).










(a) Extended Gini Inequality Measure










(b) Atkinson Inequality Measure










(c) Entropy Inequality Measure
Figure 2: Benchmarks for the Diﬀerent Inequality Measures
11III Results
Recall that we asked our subjects how the 84 income values of the yk’s should be adapted.
These data allowed us to compute the γ’s. They represent the data set of our analysis.
Summarizing all cases of Theorem 10, the theoretically correct sign of γ is determined
by
(1) signγ ˙ = sign ([|yj − yk| − max{|yj − y
∗|,|yk − y
∗|}] × δ).
This formula means that, if yj and yk are on the same side of the benchmark, then
|yj − yk| < max{|yj − y∗|,|yk − y∗|}, and γ should be negative for δ > 0 and posi-
tive for δ < 0. If yj and yk are on opposite sides of the benchmark, then |yj − yk| >
max{|yj − y∗|,|yk − y∗|} and γ should be positive for δ > 0 and negative for δ < 0.
Notice that we had no direct data on subjects’ benchmarks. As our subjects did
not know Theorem 10, they would not have understood queries for their benchmark.
Thus, we were left to the message of Table 1, demonstrating that values of benchmarks
outside the interval (e750, e1500) are extremely unlikely. This allowed us to assume
for all benchmarks the condition e750 < y∗ < e1500. Given this assumption, we could
partition our stimulus set into three subsets:
(a) Same side: The incomes involved lie certainly on the same side of the benchmark.
This covers the stimuli (yi,yk) ∈ {(500,750), (750,500), (1500,1750), (1750,1500),
(1500,2000), (2000,1500), (1750,2000), (2000,1750)}, both for δ > 0 and δ < 0, i.e.,
16 stimuli.
(b) Opposite sides: The incomes involved lie certainly on opposite sides of the bench-
mark. This covers the stimuli (yi,yk) ∈ {(500,1500), (1500,500), (500,1750), (1750,500),
(500,2000), (2000,500), (750,1500), (1500,750), (750,1750), (1750,750), (750,2000),
(2000,750)}, both for δ > 0 and δ < 0, i.e., 24 stimuli.
(c) Benchmark?: The remaining 44 stimuli, for which there was no a priori reasoning on
which side of the benchmark the incomes involved lie.
Descriptive statistics of our results are provided in Tables 2 and 3.
12Stimulus subsets
δ > 0 δ < 0
yj < yk yj > yk yj < yk yj > yk
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(a) Same side 18.64 97.54 45.66 86.23 -56.37 101.15 -2.52 84.42
(b) Opposite sides 39.75 121.53 72.63 84.80 -94.42 118.85 12.76 90.36
(c) Benchmark? 25.34 109.97 54.16 85.81 -52.53 96.10 2.37 87.89
Aggregate 28.19 111.36 57.81 86.07 -65.19 105.52 4.40 88.09
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for the Values of γ.
According to the leaky-bucket theory, we should have observed for the subset (a)
negative γ’s for δ > 0 and positive γ’s for δ < 0. However, Table 2 shows us that the
opposite holds for the mean value of the γ’s. For the subset (b) we should have observed
positive γ’s for δ > 0 and negative γ’s for δ < 0. Table 2 demonstrates that this is
evidenced by the data for the mean value of the γ’s, except for the case δ < 0, yj > yk.
The subset (c) covers the case for which we cannot rely on a priori reasoning about the
benchmarks. Provided that subjects’ benchmarks are symmetrically distributed around
e1250, the leaky-bucket theory would demand a mean value of the γ’s near zero. However,
Table 2 exhibits positive mean values of the γ’s for δ > 0, and negative mean values of
the γ’s for δ < 0. Whereas the mean values of γ are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
δ > 0, the mean value of γ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for δ < 0 and yj < yk only.
For δ < 0 and yj > yk a Wilcoxon test shows that the mean value of γ is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. With the exception of this latter case, the overall results conﬁrm that

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14In Table 3, we present the absolute numbers and the percentages of positive, negative,
and zero values of the γ’s for the four basic cases for the subsets (a), (b), and (c). These
results reinforce the behavioral pattern observed in Table 2. They show the preponderance
of positive income compensations for income gains (δ > 0) and negative income compen-
sations for income losses (δ < 0). Broadly speaking, subjects’ perceptions to maintain the
degree of income inequality seem to follow a simple precept: If someone gains income, the
other person involved should be positively compensated, and if someone loses income, the
other person involved in the transfer should be negatively compensated. This expresses a
sort of compensating justice rather than restoration of former degree of income inequality,
according to the leaky-bucket theory as explained in Theorem 10. Whenever the leaky-
bucket theory coincides with the compensating-justice hypothesis, then it is empirically
evidenced (e.g., for incomes lying on opposite sides of the benchmark), otherwise it is
empirically declined.
Moreover, Tables 2 and 3 reveal a particular pattern of compensating justice:
(i) When an income recipient receives an extra income of e100 (δ > 0), our subjects
hold that the other income recipient should also receive an extra income (γ > 0) in
order to maintain the degree of income inequality. However, when the other income
recipient is poorer, he or she should receive considerably more extra income than
when he or she is richer.
(ii) When an income recipient experiences an income loss of e100 (δ < 0), our data show
that, when the other income recipient is richer, he or she should also experience an
income loss (γ < 0). However, when the other income recipient is poorer, our
subjects hold that his or her income should stay put in order to maintain the degree
of income inequality.
When screening the data for the various stimuli, these tendencies become more pro-
nounced the poorer or richer the involved income recipients are.
More formally, let | δ |< mini,`∈{1,...,n} | yi−y` |, let γk and γi denote the γ’s for income
recipients k and i, respectively, and let yj → yj+δ. Then we have for δ > 0 and k < j < i
that γk > γi > 0; moreover, the γk’s increase and the γi’s decrease as j increases. For
δ < 0 and k < j < i we have: γk > γi, γi < 0, and both the γk’s and the γi’s increase as j
15increases (for this case the γk’s are not necessarily negative). When the primary changes
in income move to the extremes of our experimental income distribution, this tendency
becomes less clear-cut.
In order to capture these qualitative ﬁndings in quantitative terms, we used a logarith-
mic equation. We ﬁnally settled on this functional form because all parameters with the





g(lnyj − lnyk)t + ε
g
st, s = 1,...,41; t = 1,...,21
using the panel-data estimation method with random eﬀects for the four categories g =
1,...,4 resulting from δ ≷ 0 and yj ≶ yk. The results are presented in Table 4 (bold-faced
















Table 4: Simple Compensating Justice [equation
(2)]
(p-values in parentheses).
This table shows us that the distance of the logs of the incomes has a particularly
pronounced impact on γ, when either the richer income recipient gains δ, or when the
poorer income recipient loses δ. But the general tendency of compensating justice is also
present for the other two cases. For instance, the coeﬃcient estimates for Equation (2)
show that, when an income recipient with an income of e1000 [e1250] gains e100, then
an income recipient with an income of e500 should be compensated with e61.54 [e70.27],
16and an income recipient with an income of e2000 should be compensated with e30.75
[e24.76]. (Note that the additive constant of the last ﬁgures is nonsigniﬁcant.) When an
income recipient with an income of e1000 [e1250] loses e100, then an income recipient
with an income of e500 should gain e8.17 [e16.82], whereas an income recipient with an
income of e2000 should lose e62.09 [e57.85].
Summarizing the results of our leaky–bucket experiment, we found that the leaky–
bucket Theorem 10 lacks empirical support. Rather compensating justice holds (Tables
2 and 3). Only when the leaky-bucket theory concurs with the compensating-justice
hypothesis, it enjoys empirical support. This holds only for transfers between income
recipients whose incomes lie on opposite sides of the benchmarks (i.e., the last line of the
table in Theorem 10). For transfers between income recipients on the same side of the
benchmark the leaky-bucket theory is empirically not supported. Compensating justice
proves to be the better hypothesis to describe subjects’ behavior in case of transfers with
transaction costs.
IV Conclusion
During the last 110 years, admirable advances have been made in the ﬁelds of theoret-
ical and empirical research of income inequality measurement, and the related ﬁeld of
concentration measurement.16 Comprehensive information on this research can be gained
from a great number of excellent surveys and textbooks.17 Yet it is only a bit more
than a decade since disillusion with the popular acceptance of central axioms of income
inequality measurement began to undermine faith in the validity of inequality measure-
ment. A number of questionnaire and experimental studies showed poor acceptance of
central distributional axioms such as scale invariance, the income equalizing eﬀects of
income translations, the population principle, Pareto-dominance, Lorenz-dominance, and
the transfer principle.18 Even for the simplest experimental designs in terms of numbers,
the acceptance rates of these axioms hardly exceed some 40%. This seems to be caused
by response-mode eﬀects: if the axioms are presented in verbal form, agreement rises up
to some 60%.19 Subjects seem to have diﬃculties in transforming verbal convictions into
numbers.
The theoretical analysis of leaky-bucket transactions, which can be seen as a generali-
17zation of the transfer principle with transaction costs, is of recent origin (Seidl (2001);
Hoﬀmann (2001); Lambert and Lanza (2006)). It has opened up new avenues of analysis.
Rather than tracing out the maximum leakage of transaction costs such that a transfer still
“pays at the margin”,20 the theory has shown a plethora of possible results. In Theorem
10 we showed that leaky-bucket transactions encompass twelve cases each of which entails
diﬀerent results. Only one of them covers the traditional case of transfers which allows
the transferee to receive a positive fraction of the transfer taken from a richer transferor.
Our experimental research showed that leaky-bucket theory is poorly evidenced by the
data. Subjects rather follow some notion of compensating justice: If an income recipient
loses income, the other income recipient involved should be negatively compensated, and if
an income recipient gains income, the other income recipient involved should be positively
compensated. Whenever the leaky-bucket theory coincides with the compensating-justice
hypothesis, then it is conﬁrmed (e.g., for incomes lying on opposite sides of the bench-
mark), otherwise it is declined.
Our central ﬁnding is that compensating justice asks for a higher compensation for the
poorer income recipient (as compared to richer income recipients) in the case of income
gains, and a lower loss (or even a small gain) for the poorer income recipient (as compared
to richer income recipients) in the case of income losses. When screening the data for
the various stimuli, these tendencies become more pronounced the poorer or richer the
involved income recipients are.
The compensating-justice hypothesis, whose empirical validity was demonstrated in
this paper, is at variance with the transfer principle. Moreover, any income inequality
measure which satisﬁes leaky-bucket consistency (that is, the transaction costs associated
with a progressive transfer which maintains the degree of income inequality must not
exceed the amount of the transfer itself) violates the transfer principle, too. Although
compensating justice captures subjects’ inequality perceptions for transfers with trans-
action costs much better than leaky-bucket theory does, it cannot be expressed by an
income inequality measure except by constant income inequality measures. For the re-
spective impossibility theorems and a possibility theorem see Lasso de la Vega and Seidl
(2007).
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Notes
1This case was termed the leaky-bucket paradox by Seidl (2001).
2These beliefs were entertained, e.g., by Atkinson (1970, p. 5), Okun (1975, pp. 91–95), Jenkins (1991,
pp. 28–29), and Amiel et al. (1999, pp. 87–89).—Notice the diﬀerence from the pure transfer principle:
whereas the pure transfer principle focuses on changes in the degree of income inequality, the transfer
principle with leakages focuses on the maintenance of the degree of income inequality.
3For related work see Amiel et al. (1999) and Beckman et al. (2003a; 2003b).
4Even the seminal theoretical paper of Lambert and Lanza (2006), which treats leaky buckets in terms
of inequality measures exclusively, focuses on progressive transfers only, which covers just three out of
twelve possible cases. In contrast to that, Hoﬀmann (2001, pp. 239-240) focuses on income increases of
a particular income recipient and on regressive transfers.
5Therefore, we allow only for strictly positive incomes, which are diﬀerent for diﬀerent income recipi-
ents. For the general theory see Lambert and Lanza (2006).
6The reader might wonder why we do not conﬁne the range of income inequality measures to the unit
interval. Yet there are some recognized income inequality measures which do not satisfy this condition,
most notably the entropy income inequality measure.
7This is evidenced by the widespread empirical rejection of the transfer principle; see Amiel and Cowell
(1992; 1994a; 1998; 1999b, p. 118; 2000) and Harrison and Seidl (1994a,b).
8In the software they could enter any integer number between zero and 2,200.
9Already before embarking on the phase of real data collection, subjects were invited to trial plays in
order to become fully acquainted with the program. Only when they pressed a “start”-button did the
actual experiment begin. Moreover, an experimenter was present all the time who could be addressed in
case of questions or problems.
10Other experimenters, e.g., Amiel et al. (1999, pp. 94-95), stated explicitly in their instructions that
some amount was taken from a person and ask for the minimum amount that should be given to some
23other person to make the transfer worthwhile. This addressed an act of redistribution and appealed to
subjects’ desire for transfers or feelings of social envy rather than to their perception of the degree of
income inequality. We were only interested in the latter aspect.
11It is noteworthy that subjects were not rolled in for the experiment, but individually showed up for
the experiment in the laboratory at any time during one calendar week. They knew beforehand that they
were not going to receive any ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial reward for their participation in the experiment.
On average they took one hour to complete all questions. In fact, they were allowed to leave without
completion, but only one subject did so.
12Two typing errors were eliminated. Therefore the case numbers in the aggregate line of Table 3 sum
to 861 for δ > 0, yj < yk and for δ < 0, yj > yk, whereas they sum to 860 for δ > 0, yj > yk and for
δ < 0, yj < yk.
13Note that these common measures serve only as auxiliary means for the purpose of estimating realistic
intervals for the benchmarks. This enables us to properly analyze our experimental data. The alternative
of asking subjects directly for their benchmarks is not viable, because the existence and the working of the
benchmarks was until recently not even known to the experts. Hence we could not assume that subjects
were knowledgeable of the benchmarks. As the mathematics to show the graphics in Figure 2 and the
values in Table 1 is extensive and serves only the purpose of a proper calibration of the experimental
benchmarks, we have omitted it from this presentation. It is presented in the Appendix.
14See the preceeding footnote.
15We tried also some other equations, e.g., depending on the diﬀerences of the plain incomes, or using
dummies for the income position of the income recipient whose income is changed by δ. However, no
substantial diﬀerences in the results were observed. Therefore, we settled on equation (2), which allows
for an immediate interpretation and intuition. Other estimates are provided in the Appendix.
16Cf., e.g., Pareto (1895), Lorenz (1905), Gini (1912; 1914), Dalton (1920), Bonferroni (1930), Herﬁnd-
ahl (1950), Champernowne (1952; 1974), Amato (1968), David (1968), Kolm (1969), Atkinson (1970),
Piesch (1975), Fishburn and Willig (1984), Ok (1995).
17Cf., e.g., Cowell (1977; 2000), Nyg˚ ard and Sandstr¨ om (1981), Kanbur (1984), Foster (1985), Lambert
(1989), Chakravarty (1990), Jenkins (1991), Champernowne and Cowell (1998), Silber (1999).
18Cf. Amiel and Cowell (1992; 1994a,b; 1998; 1999a,b; 2000); Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1993); Harri-
son and Seidl (1994a,b); Bernasconi (2002); Traub et al. (2007); Camacho-Cuena and Seidl (2007).
19Our experiment was carried out in terms of numbers. It did not seem viable to us to ask respective
questions in verbal form because of the greater intricacy of leaky-bucket transactions.





Income Inequality Measures to Calibrate the
Benchmarks
by Eva Camacho-Cuena, Tibor Neugebauer, and Christian Seidl
To interpret our data in the main paper, we use three common income inequality measures,
viz. entropy1, extended Atkinson2, and extended Gini3.
Note that these common measures serve only as auxiliary means for the purpose of
estimating realistic intervals for the benchmarks. This enables us to properly analyze our
experimental data. The alternative of asking subjects directly for their benchmarks is not
viable, because the existence and the working of the benchmarks was until recently not
even known to the experts. Hence we could not assume that subjects were knowledgeable
of the benchmarks.
Income inequality measures may either process incomes only in increasing (or decreas-
ing) order, or may process them in any order. The former ones are called positional
income inequality measures, the latter ones are called nonpositional income inequality
measures.4 We shall focus on two families of nonpositional inequality measures, viz. the
entropy class and the extended Atkinson class of income inequality measures, and on the
extended Gini class for positional income inequality measures.


































for c = 0;
where µ denotes the mean income.
Definition 12: The extended Atkinson class of income inequality measures is deﬁned
as:











for θ > 0, θ 6= 1;








for θ = 1;









for θ = 0;











for θ < 0.
1Remark 13: The plain Atkinson income inequality measure is deﬁned as IAθ(y) = 1−
µθ
µ
for θ > 0, where µθ denotes the equally distributed equivalent income. In the Atkinson
deﬁnition µθ is just the generalized mean of the standardized incomes with parameter
θ > 0. For negative θ the plain Atkinson income inequality measure is not deﬁned
for inequality aversion. One could associate it with inequality sympathy, which would,
however, yield negative values for the inequality measure. An elegant mathematical escape
from this diﬃculty is the extended Atkinson family as proposed by Lasso de la Vega
and Urrutia (2006). They deﬁne the Atkinson income inequality measure for θ 6 0 as
IAθ(y) = 1 −
µ
µθ.
The so deﬁned extended Atkinson income inequality measure satisﬁes inequality aver-
sion for all real values of θ and, thus, also the transfer principle. However, it does not
satisfy transfer sensitivity for the branch θ 6 0; it shares this property with the en-
tropy income inequality measure for the branch c > 1. Moreover, both income inequality
measures are not invertible, that is they associate two parameter values with the same
inequality indicator. Note that, contrary to the entropy inequality measure, the extended
Atkinson income inequality measure has the advantage that its range is the unit interval.
However, IAθ(y), θ 6 0, raises problems of economic intuition.6



















, ν > 1.
For ν = 2, the extended Gini measure becomes the orthodox Gini coeﬃcient.
Definition 15: A general income inequality measure deﬁned on Y, I : Rn














where the w(i)’s denote some weights, and u(·) denotes the utility of income normalized
for mean income.
Theorem 16: We have
(i) for nonpositional income inequality measures
∂I
∂yk
≷ 0 ⇔ yk ≷ y

















(ii) for positional income inequality measures:
∂I
∂yk
≷ 0 ⇔ w(k) ≷ I(·),
Proof: Lambert and Lanza (2006, pp. 255-256, 257, and 261).
Theorem 17: Let α stand for c and 1−θ, i.e., α = c = 1−θ. Then the benchmarks for
α coincide for the entropy and the extended Atkinson income inequality measures.
2Proof: From the deﬁnitions of the inequality measures it is immediate that
IA(y) =

    
    
1 − [1 − α(1 − α)IE(y)]
1
α , α < 1, α 6= 0;
1 − e−IE(y), α = 0;
IA(y) = 1 − 1
IE(y), α = 1;
IA(y) = 1 − [1 − α(1 − α)IE(y)]
− 1
α , α > 1.
Diﬀerentiating both sides of these equations partially with respect to y and setting the
partial derivatives equal to zero for y = y∗ shows
∂IA(y)
∂y









Theorem 18: The benchmarks y∗ are
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   





















for α 6= 0,1;
(ii) for the extended Gini income inequality measure:
yk 6 y∗ 6 yk+1 such that w(k) > IG(y) > w(k + 1),











∂y |y=y∗= 0 for the entropy and the extended Atkinson income in-
equality measure as stated in Deﬁnitions 11 and 12 using the notation of Theorem 17.
The proof for the extended Gini income inequality measure follows from Theorem 16 and
Seidl (2001).
Q.E.D.
Remark 19: Recall that α = c = 1 − θ. Thus, when plotting the benchmarks as
functions of the conventional distributional parameters, the graphs are mirror images
of each other. For instance, for the extended Atkinson income inequality measure, our
experimental income distribution associates the benchmark of e1500 with the parameter
value of θ = −1.68. For the entropy income inequality measure, the benchmark of e1500
is associated with the parameter value c = 2.68. For the benchmark of e1000 we have
θ = 3.11 and c = −2.11. Although re-deﬁning the distributional parameters7 would show
identical plots of the benchmarks, we decided to stick to the conventional parameters of
the respective income inequality measures.
3Remark 20: The relationship between the entropy and the extended Atkinson income
inequality measures is, however, nonlinear as the proof of Theorem 17 shows us. This
implies that the values of these income inequality measures are diﬀerent even if we deﬁne
c = 1−θ. They convey diﬀerent messages; otherwise we could dispense with one of them.
Theorems 16 and 18 show that the benchmarks are functions of all incomes and of
the parameters of the income inequality measures. Instead of ﬁnitely many incomes one
can alternatively work with continuous income distributions. Then the benchmarks for
continuous income distributions are functions of the parameters of the density functions
of the continuous income distributions and of the parameters of the income inequality
measures [see Hoﬀmann (2001, pp. 245-248)]. As our paper focuses on an experiment
with only seven incomes, we do not deal with continuous income distributions.
It is well known that income inequality measures have associated social welfare func-
tions, W : Rn
++ → R. In general, a social welfare function is a decreasing function F(·)
of an income inequality measure: W(y) = F[I(y)]. Hence, the social welfare function
inherits the property of inequality aversion with reversed inequality signs.
As F(·) is arbitrary otherwise, any I(y) deﬁnes a whole family of social welfare func-
tions. Once the transformation F(·) has been agreed upon, the benchmark for the social















A convenient way of formulating a social welfare function was proposed by Blackorby
and Donaldson (1978, pp. 69-70). They suggest to ﬁrst multiply an income inequality
measure by (−1) to change its welfare implication from a decreasing to an increasing
scale, then add 1 to normalize for the value of 1 for income equality, and ﬁnally multiply
by the mean income µ to enter an eﬃciency component.8 Following this approach, we
















For income inequality measures whose values are conﬁned to the unit interval,
1−I(y)
nµ >
0, and the benchmark of the associated social welfare function is, by Theorem 7, higher
than the benchmark of the associated income inequality measure.
Because the class of admissible social welfare functions has the power inﬁnity, and
because we asked our subjects only for their income inequality perceptions, we did not
consider social welfare functions in the main paper any further.
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5Notes
1The entropy income inequality measures were developed by Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980),
and Shorrocks (1980; 1984) to identify income inequality measures which are decomposable for diﬀer-
ent homogenous subgroups of income recipients. Decomposition occurs with respect to a within-group
component (a weighted sum of the inequality indices of the subgroups), and a between-group compo-
nent (the inequality measure evaluated by assigning every member of a subgroup the mean income of
the respective subgroup). Entropy income inequality measures are, too, driven by an inequality-aversion
parameter. They are generalizations of two non-parameterized income inequality measures originally
proposed by Theil.
2This income inequality measure is based on the concept of the equally distributed equivalent income,
which was foreshadowed by Champernowne (1952), and ﬁrst formulated by Kolm (1969). Atkinson (1970)
re-established this concept and made it the centerpiece of his famous income inequality measure. It was
extended by Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006).
3The Gini coeﬃcient was introduced by Gini (1912; 1914). It can be expressed in several diﬀerent ways.
For a concise survey see, e.g., Anand (1982, appendix). The Gini coeﬃcient may, akin to the Atkinson
income inequality measure, be extended to include an inequality-aversion parameter. Pioneering work
was done by Donaldson and Weymark (1980), Weymark (1981), Yitzhaki (1983), and Chakravarty (1988).
4When nonpositional income inequality measures satisfy symmetry, consequently the ordering of an
income distribution becomes immaterial.
5IE1 is Theil’s T inequality measure, IE0 is Theil’s L inequality measure. For c = 2, IE2 = 1
2V 2,
where V is the coeﬃcient of variation of the incomes.
6As µθ > µ for θ 6 0, inequality sympathy obtains and, therefore, IAθ(y) =
µθ−µ
µθ can be interpreted as
the relative monetary gain due to the prevailing unequal income distribution rather than as an indicator
of the relative welfare loss in monetary terms due to income inequality. A related interpretation may
concern the entropy inequality measure for the branch c > 1.
7This was, for instance, done by Lasso de la Vega and Urriarte (2006).
8For further work on the relationship between income inequality measures and social welfare functions




Alternative Estimates of Equation 2
by Eva Camacho-Cuena, Tibor Neugebauer, and Christian Seidl
In our paper we used a logarithmic equation to capture our qualitative ﬁndings in quan-
titative terms. We ﬁnally settled on this functional form because all parameters with
the exception of one are signiﬁcant at the 10% signiﬁcance level. Alternatively, we used
a functional form of the plain diﬀerences of the income levels of the income recipients





g(yj − yk)t + ε
g
st, s = 1,...,41; t = 1,...,21
using the panel-data estimation method with random eﬀects for the four categories g =
1,...,4 resulting from δ ≷ 0 and yj ≶ yk. The results are presented in Table 5 (bold-faced
















Table 5: Simple Compensating Justice [equation (3)]
(p-values in parentheses).
This table shows us that the income distance has a much higher impact on γ, when
either the richer income recipient gains δ, or when the poorer income recipient loses δ. For
instance, the coeﬃcient estimates for Equation (3) show that, when an income recipient
gains e100, a poorer income recipient is compensated with e45.78 for the minimum
distance of e250, and with e81.70 for the maximum distance of e1500. When an income
recipient loses e100, a richer income recipient’s income should be reduced by e37.26 for
the minimum distance of e250, and by e121.52 for the maximum distance of e1500.
For the remaining two cases, the tendency of compensating justice is much weaker.
When an income recipient is given e100, a richer income recipient should receive a small
positive compensation. Notice that the coeﬃcient of the distance is small and nonsignif-
icant. When an income recipient loses e100, a poorer income recipient should only lose
income if his or her income is no more distant than e250 (note again that the negative
constant is nonsigniﬁcant).
1Our qualitative results suggest that γ does not only depend on the income distance, but
also on the income position of the income recipient whose income is changed by δ. This
led us to estimate a modiﬁed version of Equation (3) which includes dummies representing

































s = 1,...,41; t = 1,...,21,
where ∆i = 0 for i 6= j and ∆i = 1 for i = j. Equation (4) is calibrated for the median
income y4 = e1250, which implies that ∆4 = 0. Using the panel-data estimation method,
we estimated again four equations for g = 1,...,4 corresponding to the four categories
resulting from δ ≶ 0 and yj ≶ yk. In Table 6 we present the results (bold-faced coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level).
We deﬁne the behavioral pattern as observed in Table 6 as graded compensating justice.
It operates in this way:
• When a poorer income recipient j experiences an extra income of e100 (ﬁrst line
of Table 6), a richer income recipient k is ﬁrst awarded a ﬁxed amount of e19.68.
This amount is diminished by 2.09% of the income diﬀerence between the two in-
come recipients. The increase in income of the richer income recipient k is higher,
the poorer the income recipient j is who gets e100. This obviously allows higher
compensations to the richer income recipient. Thus, the values of the dummies
decrease if better endowed income recipients receive e100. Notice that, although
not all dummies are signiﬁcant, their pattern conforms with the expectations of the
compensating-justice hypothesis.
• When a richer income recipient j experiences an extra income of e100 (second line
of Table 6), a poorer income recipient k should even be higher compensated than the
richer income recipient in the former case. He or she is awarded a ﬁxed amount of
e37.89 plus 4.48% of the income diﬀerence between the two parties. If j’s income is
below e1,250, the poorer income recipient k gets an additional premium. For income
recipients j with incomes above e1,250, the poorer subject k seems to perceive some
overshooting due to the 4.48% of the income diﬀerence. This is corrected that by a
negative amount which further decreases as the income position of the richer income
recipient increases.
• When a poorer income recipient j experiences an income decrement of e100 (third
line of Table 6), then, according to the hypothesis of compensating justice, the
income of a richer income recipient k should also experience a loss. Table 6 shows
that this income loss should be made up by a ﬁxed amount of e18.22 plus 8.19%
of the income diﬀerence. Overshooting due to the 8.19% of the income diﬀerence is
counteracted by another amount for income recipients j with incomes below e1,250.
For income recipients j with income exceeding e1,250, the income loss is reinforced.
• When a richer income recipient j experiences an income loss of e100 (fourth line
of Table 6), a poorer income recipient k should experience an increase of income
amounting to 4.25% of the income diﬀerence plus an amount which decreases as the
income position of the richer income recipient increases. Calculations show that,
with the exception of the lowest incomes among the poorer income recipients, this

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s = 1,...,41; t = 1,...,21,
where ∆i = 0 for i 6= j and ∆i = 1 for i = j. Like Equation (4) it is also calibrated
for the median income y4 = e1250, which implies that ∆4 = 0. Using the panel-data
estimation method, we estimated again four equations for g = 1,...,4 corresponding to
the four categories resulting from δ ≶ 0 and yj ≶ yk. In Table (7) we present the results
(bold-faced coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level).
Table (7) shows us that using the logs of the incomes provides a slight improvement: we
now observe 17 coeﬃcients which are signiﬁcant at the 10% level instead of 15. However,
the gain is minor: whereas the coeﬃcients in Table (6) perform better for the case δ > 0
and yj > yk, the coeﬃcients in Table (7) perform better for the case δ < 0 and yj < yk.
Summarizing the results of our leaky–bucket experiment, we found that the leaky–
bucket Theorem 10 lacks empirical support. Rather compensating justice holds (Tables
2 and 3). Only when the leaky-bucket theory concurs with the compensating-justice
hypothesis, it enjoys empirical support. This holds only for transfers between income
recipients whose incomes lie on opposite sides of the benchmarks (i.e., the last line of the
table in Theorem 10. For transfers between income recipients on the same side of the
benchmark the leaky-bucket theory is empirically not supported. Compensating justice




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































by Eva Camacho-Cuena, Tibor Neugebauer, and Christian Seidl
We recruited subjects with diﬀerent backgrounds. In order to provide a common basic
understanding of income distributions, they underwent a training which should alert them
to the problems of income inequality without inﬂuencing their opinions. They were just
alerted that sometimes diﬀerent views are possible. The motivation part illustrates just
our considerations for the presentation of the respective problems. They were not dis-
closed to our subjects.
Problem 1: Consider two income distributions:
A = [10,20,30,50,70,80,90]
B = [50,50,50,50,50,50,50]
Question: Which of the two income distributions is more equally distributed?
Motivation: Obviously B is more equally distributed than A, although some subjects
might prefer to live in a society with income distribution A. Problem 1 was intended to
convey the notion of “more equally distributed” versus “preferred” income distributions.
Problem 2: Consider income distribution:
C = [100,200,300,500,700,800,900]
and compare it with B.
Questions:
(i) Which of the two income distributions is more equally distributed? [Obviously B.]
(ii) Which of the two income distributions generates more income for the economy?
[Obviously C.]
(iii) Which of the two income distributions generates more welfare for the economy?
[The answer depends on the subject’s social welfare function. For welfarist social
welfare functions, C generates more welfare. If equality preferences enter the social
welfare function, B might also emerge as generating higher welfare.]
(iv) Would you rather live in a society with income distributions B or C if your own
income position will be later on determined by chance? [The answer depends on
the subject’s distributional preferences and on his or her risk attitude.]
1Motivation: This problem should alert subjects that a diﬀerent focus of evaluating
income distributions may ask for diﬀerent responses who apparently conﬂict, but are nev-
ertheless mutually consistent.





(i) Is D more equally or more unequally distributed than A?
(ii) Is E more equally or more unequally distributed than A?
Motivation: In D, as compared with A, the second richest person loses 10 monetary
units. In E, as compared with A, the second poorest person loses 10 monetary units.
There is not right or wrong answer; it is up to the view of the beholder whether D or E
is more equally or more unequally distributed than A. This example was chosen to alert
subjects to the situation that richer or poorer income recipients might lose income, which
may be considered diﬀerently. As D has a move most probably above the benchmark and
E below the benchmark, a subject bound to the transfer principle should consider D to
be more unequally distributed and E to be more equally distributed than A.





(i) Is F more equally or more unequally distributed than A?
(ii) Is G more equally or more unequally distributed than A?
(iii) Is D more equally or more unequally distributed than F?
Motivation: Problem 4 is an exercise in the transfer principle. F comes about from A
if 10 monetary units are transferred from the second richest to the second poorest income
recipient. G comes about from A if 10 monetary units are transferred from the richest to
the poorest income recipient. G can come about from F in two ways: (i) the second poor-
est transfers 10 monetary units to the poorest income recipient, and the richest transfers
10 monetary units to the second richest income recipient; thus, we have two progressive
transfers. (ii) The richest transfers 10 monetary units to the poorest income recipient,
2and the second poorest transfers 10 monetary units to the second richest income recipient;
thus, we have a progressive and a regressive transfer. Hence, the transition from F to
G can be seen in diﬀerent ways. If procedure invariance holds, then both views should
yield the same result. If procedure invariance is violated, both views can yield diﬀerent re-
sults. Problem 4 was chosen to alert subjects to possibly diﬀerent views of the same result.





(i) Is H more equally or more unequally distributed than A?
(ii) Is J more equally or more unequally distributed than A?
(iii) Is J more equally or more unequally distributed than H?
Motivation: Again there is no right or wrong answer to these questions. H comes
about from A by an income loss of 5 monetary units of the poorest income recipient
and by an income loss of 10 monetary units of the second richest income recipient. This
depicts income changes which point in the same direction and can serve as an example
for graded compensating justice. J comes about from A by a gain of 5 monetary units
of the poorest income recipient and a loss of 10 monetary units of the richest income
recipient. This is a case which is at variance with graded compensating justice. J can
come about from H in two ways: (i) the poorest income recipient receives 10 monetary
units and the richest income recipient transfers 10 monetary units to the second richest
income recipient. (ii) The richest income recipient transfers 10 monetary units to the
poorest income recipient and the second richest income recipient receives 10 monetary
units. If procedure invariance holds, then both views should yield the same result. If
procedure invariance is violated, both views can yield diﬀerent results.
3LEAKY BUCKETS VERSUS COMPENSATING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL 
INVESTIGATION – INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
by Eva Camacho-Cuena, Tibor Neugebauer, and Christian Seidl 
   
You are going to participate in an experiment in which your personal opinion is object of 
investigation. To avoid any external influence we would like to ask you to refrain from 
contacting other participants. Please take your decisions alone according to your discretion! 
 
Do not hesitate to ask any question concerning these instructions. It is crucially important that 
you understand all details before you take any decision. 
 
In the experiment your task is to compare two income distributions with each other. The first 
income distribution (“the original distribution”) is given by the monthly income of 7 students 
as follows: 
 
One student faces an income of      500 Euro,  
a second student’s income is       750 Euro, 
a third student’s income is        1000 Euro, 
a fourth student’s income is        1250 Euro, 
a fifth student’s income is         1500 Euro, 
a sixth student’s income is        1750 Euro, 
a seventh student’s income is       2000 Euro. 
 
As you see, the students’ incomes are very different. In other words, the income distribution 
exhibits a high degree of inequality.  
 
The second income distribution (“new income distribution”) is partly determined by you and 
by the computer. The computer picks the incomes of two students, the first of which is 
changed by 100 Euro. The student receives either 100 Euro more or less than in the original 
income distribution. You have to decide about the income to be assigned to the second 
student. On your screen this income is framed green on white background (green means “to 
be assigned”), the income of the first student is framed red on black background (red has the 
meaning “new income distribution”).  
 
Your task is one of determining the amount to be assigned to the second student such that the 
same degree of inequality of the original distribution is re-established in the new distribution. 
You surely understand that this task is a problem of (individual) opinion to which no objective 
solution can exist.  
 
All your decisions you make alone at the computer. Before you start with the experiment you 
can run a trial of indeterminate length at the computer. As soon as you like to finish the trial 
and begin with the experiment you press the start button at the upper bound of your screen. 
During the trial run you may check whether you have understood the instructions entirely. 
Please ask the experimenter in case you have any doubts. 
 
To insert your decision into the computer you have to choose an amount to be assigned to the 
second student by pressing the corresponding keys in the input table at the lower left bound of 
your screen and confirming the choice with the enter key (↵). Your entry will be displayed at 
the right side in the lower half of your screen within a window labelled New Income 
Distribution. It will be visualized through the length of blue bars in a histogram. As soon as 
1you confirm any entry with the enter key the bar representing the income of the second 




A blue bar represents the income of every student. If the income of one student differs 
between the new and the original income distribution the change will be visualized in the 
histogram. A white-blue bar represents a decrease in the new income distribution in 
comparison to the original one. If the income in the new income distribution is greater than in 
the original one, a white crossbar will indicate the original income in the histogram of the new 
income distribution. 
 
To confirm your choice you have to press the button labelled “OK”. It will pop up on your 
display below the income table as soon as you have inserted a new income for the second 
student. Please press the button only if you are sure about your decision! -You will not be able 
to revoke your decision thereafter.- As long as you have not pressed the OK-button you can 
make a new entry anytime. 
 
When you choose the income of the second student it is possible that the order of incomes 
within the students shifts. In other words, the second student can be assigned more (less) 
income than the students with greater (smaller) income in the original distribution. Shall you 
confirm such a choice with “OK” you will be prompted whether you are sure about it. 
 
After having confirmed with OK you proceed to the next round by entering any key. Please 
take notice of the information given to you at the bottom line of the screen. There you are 
given instantaneous instructions about to do next. 
 
In total, the experiment consists of 84 rounds. That is, you must decide 84 times about what to 
assign to the second student to establish the same degree of inequality in both income 
























On the display you confirm your choice by pressing „OK“, or you decide to make another 























In this example, a confirmation induces a change in the ranks of the income distribution. The 
student who originally has the third highest income of 1500 Euro would receive 200 Euro in 
the new income distribution. In this case his income would be lower than the fourth highest 
income 1250. It is possible that you make a choice that affects the ranks of the income by 
mistake. Therefore, if your choice affects the ranks of the distribution you will be prompted 
on the screen. By a press on the button, you are able to change your choice or confirm it if 





















As soon as you want to start the experiment you must press the start button at the upper bound 



























As soon as you have pressed the start button, you will be asked for confirmation. You confirm 
by pressing “Continue >” or you abort by pressing “< Back” to return to the trial rounds.  
 
4 
As soon as you have confirmed your decision by „Continue >“, the first round of the 
experiment is going to start. Thereafter, all your decisions will be recorded. 
  
Enjoy! 
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